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WHO NEEDS A UNIFORM CONTRACT LAW, AND WHY?
INGEBORG SCHWENZER*

C

ONTRACT law, especially commercial contract law, has always been
at the forefront of harmonization and unification of private law. The
reason is that different domestic laws are perceived as an obstacle to international trade.1 This has always been true and still holds true nowadays as
proven by many recent field studies around the world.2 In the 19th century this prompted unification at the nation-state level all over Europe, in
the 20th century the Uniform Commercial Code in the United States is
another prominent example, as well as endeavours not only on the European level3 but also in Africa.4 Most recently we witnessed similar movements in East Asia with the Principles of Asian Contract Law (PACL).5
Let me briefly discuss who is in need of a uniform contract law and
why. In general, on the international level we may roughly distinguish
three different scenarios of contracting parties.
In the first group we find parties from countries where the same language is spoken. In general, these countries also belong to the same legal
family with differences between their legal systems being minor if not neg* Prof. Dr. Ingeborg Schwenzer, LL.M. (Berkeley) is a professor of private law
at the University of Basel in Switzerland. The author is deeply indebted to Ref. iur.
Lina Ali for editing the footnotes.
1. See Ewan McKendrick, Harmonisation of European Contract Law: The State We
Are In, in THE HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAWS, BUSINESS AND LEGAL PRACTICE 5, 14–15 (Stefan Vogenauer
& Stephen Weatherill eds., 2006) (noting that “differences in national contract law
do act as a barrier to trade”).
2. See Stefan Vogenauer & Stephen Weatherill, The European Community’s Competence to Pursue the Harmonisation of Contract Law—An Empirical Contribution to the
Debate, in THE HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAWS, BUSINESS AND LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 125–27.
3. See, e.g., THE COMM’N OF EUR. CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW, PARTS I & II (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000) [hereinafter
PECL]; THE COMM’N OF EUR. CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT
LAW, PART III (Ole Lando et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter PECL III].
4. See, e.g., Acte Uniforme portant sur le Droit commercial général [Uniform
Act on General Commercial Law], Dec. 15, 2010, ORGANIZATION POUR L’HARMONISATION EN AFRIQUE DU DROIT DES AFFAIRES [ORGANIZATION FOR THE HARMONIZATION
OF BUSINESS LAW IN AFRICA] [hereinafter OHADA], available at http://www.ohada.
org/presentation-generale-de-lacte-uniforme/telechargements1.html.
5. For further information on PACL, see Shiyuan Han, Principles of Asian Contract Law: An Endeavor of Regional Harmonization of Contract Law in East Asia, 58 VILL.
L. REV. 589 (2013); see also Harmonization of Regional Laws on Obligations, FONDATION
POUR LE DROIT CONTINENTAL, http://www.fondation-droitcontinental.org/jcms/
c_7718/projet-commun-de-droit-des-contrats-en-asie-du-sud-est (last visited Apr.
15, 2013).
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ligible.6 This first of all applies to parties from English-speaking common
law countries, like parties from the United States and Canada, from Australia and New Zealand, or from India and the United Kingdom. But it
also holds true for other scenarios like those of parties from France and
Cameroon, from Argentina and Mexico, or from Germany and Austria.
First, it is possible that the parties can agree on one of their respective
legal systems. If this is not the case they can be expected to choose the law
of a third country with the same language and belonging to the same legal
tradition. In any case, the outcome of a possible dispute—be it litigated or
arbitrated—will be more or less predictable. This group comes close to
purely domestic contracts and there is hardly any need for a unification of
contract law as the parties would still prefer the law that is more familiar to
them than any unified law.
In the second group a—most probably western—company with overwhelming bargaining power contracts with an economically weaker party.
The powerful company usually will be able to impose anything that it
wants on its contract partner. It has sophisticated in-house lawyers who
carefully draft the contract preferably with a choice of law clause designating its own domestic law. If this is combined with a forum selection clause
designating the domestic courts of the economically stronger party usually
there will be no problems, at least not for the powerful party, and thus no
need for a uniform contract law. The domestic courts apply their domestic law, which in general will yield predictable and satisfactory results for
the company seated in that country. The picture may immediately
change, however, if the other party brings suit in the domestic courts of its
own country and there the forum selection clause and/or the choice of
law clause is not honoured.7 But even if these courts accept the choice of
law, it is a totally different question of how the courts will apply this foreign law. By agreeing on arbitration many of the aforementioned imponderabilities may be circumvented. Still, problems of ascertaining and
proving the chosen law—as will be described below—can be encountered.
The third group is probably by far the largest one. It consists of parties from countries where different languages are spoken, be they from a
common law and a civil law country or from two civil law countries. If
none of the parties has the economic power to impose its own law upon
the other party, i.e., where the parties are dealing at arm’s length with one
another, more often than not they will agree on a third law. This might be
a law that appears to be closely related to both parties because it influ6. For an overview of the legal families with regard to domestic sales laws, see
INGEBORG SCHWENZER ET AL., GLOBAL SALES AND CONTRACT LAW paras. 2.01–.135
(2012).
7. A prominent example is Brazil, where the validity of choice of law and
choice of forum clauses is highly controversial. For more information, see Dana
Stringer, Note, Choice of Law and Choice of Forum in Brazilian International Commercial
Contracts: Party Autonomy, International Jurisdiction, and the Emerging Third Way, 44
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 959 (2006).
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enced the law of both parties’ countries in one way or the other, like is
true for German law, for example, in relation to Italian and Japanese or
Korean law.8 If no such common background exists, more often than not,
the parties think to solve their problems by resorting to what they believe
is a “neutral law,” thereby often confusing political neutrality with suitability of the chosen law for international transactions.9 In particular, this
seems to be the case with Swiss law.
In such a case the first hurdle that the parties have to take, at least
once it comes to litigation or arbitration, is the language problem. The
parties have to investigate a foreign law in a foreign language. If the language is not the one of the litigation or arbitration in question then all the
legal materials—statutes, case law, and scholarly writings—must be translated into the language of the court or of the arbitration. Legal experts
are required to prove the content of the law that is chosen by the parties.
In some countries the experts may be appointed by the court, in others as
well as generally in arbitration each party will have to come forward with
sometimes even several experts.10 Needless to say, these procedures can
be very expensive and may be prohibitive for a party who does not have
the necessary economic power to invest these monies in the first place.
This may even be harsher under a procedural system where each party
bears its own costs regardless of the outcome of the proceedings, as is
especially the case under the so-called “American Rule” as it applies not
only in the United States, but also in Japan.11 However, even if a party is
willing to bear all these costs to prove a foreign law in court or arbitration
the question as to how this law is interpreted and applied can be highly
unpredictable.
Second, the parties will very often be taken by surprise when they realize the true content of the law that they have chosen. Just to give you one
example that in my view is rather typical for an international contract be8. For German influences in the East Asian region see SCHWENZER ET AL.,
supra note 6, ¶¶ 2.123–.127. For German influences on Italian civil law, see KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW, 102–04
(Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998).
9. Cf. Christiana Fountoulakis, The Parties’ Choice of ‘Neutral Law’ in International Sales Contracts, 7 EUR. J.L. REFORM 303, 306–07 (2005).
10. Cf. Michele Taruffo, Evidence, in 16 INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA COMP. L. ch. 7,
7.65–.66 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 2010) (regarding court proceedings); cf. Siegfried H. Elsing & John M. Townsend, Bridging the Common Law-Civil Law Divide in
Arbitration, 18 ARB. INT’L 59, 63–64 (2002) (regarding arbitration proceedings);
INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION art. 25(3) (2012); UNITED
NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [hereinafter UNCITRAL], ARBITRATION
RULES art. 27(2) (2010); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization of Arbitral Procedure, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1313, 1330 (2003).
11. For a comparative overview of how litigation costs and attorney fees are
allocated between the parties in civil litigation, see Mathias Reimann, Cost and Fee
Allocation in Civil Procedure: A Synthesis, in COST AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, 11 IUS GENTIUM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON LAW
AND JUSTICE (Mathias Reimann ed., 2012).
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tween two small and medium enterprises (SMEs); a sales contract between
a Chinese seller and an Italian buyer. As German law has had great influence on both Chinese and Italian law,12 the parties—although none of
them speaks German—believe to have a rough idea of German law and
agree on German law to govern their contract. The Chinese seller, for its
standard form contract, copies a form it finds on the Internet including a
limitation of liability clause. Whereas the clause may well live up to the
standards of the United States’ Uniform Commercial Code, it is totally
invalid under German law that provides for substantive control of standard
terms even in business-to-business (b2b) relationships.13 This is certainly
not what both parties wanted and expected in choosing German law.
Third, the outcome of the case under the law chosen may be highly
unpredictable. This especially holds true if the parties choose Swiss law.
As Switzerland is such a small country, the Swiss Supreme Court has not
yet decided many central questions of contract law or if so, the decision
may have been rendered decades ago and is disputed by scholarly writings.
This often makes the outcome of the case rather unpredictable; another
reason that may well prevent a party from pursuing its rights under the
contract.
Furthermore, especially Swiss domestic contract law in core areas is
not suitable for international contracts. This can be demonstrated by reference to only two examples. First, the Swiss Supreme Court distinguishes
between peius, i.e., defective goods, and aliud, i.e., different goods;14 the
latter giving the buyer the right to demand performance during ten years
after the conclusion of the contract notwithstanding whether it gave notice of non-performance or not,15 while the former requires the buyer to
give prompt notice of defect according to Article 201 OR to preserve any
remedies for breach of contract. Where the line between peius and aliud
will be drawn in a particular case can be extremely difficult to predict.16
The second example is compensation of consequential losses.17 Whether
there is a claim for damages without fault depends on the number of links
12. For further discussion on the influence of German law on Italian law, see
ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 8.
13. Cf. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Jan. 2, 2002,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I], as amended, §§ 305–310 (Ger.).
14. See Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Dec. 5, 1995, 121
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] III 453 (Switz.).
15. Cf. OBLIGATIONENRECHT [OR] [CIVIL CODE] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art.
127 (Switz.). For an English translation, see id., available at http://www.admin.ch/
ch/e/rs/2/210.en.pdf.
16. See Fountoulakis, supra note 9, at 308–09. For more information on the
differentiation between peius and aliud, see BASLER KOMMENTAR, OBLIGATIONENRECHT I art. 206, ¶¶ 2–3 (Heinrich Honsell et al. eds., 5th ed. 2011) [hereinafter
OBLIGATIONENRECHT I].
17. See OBLIGATIONENRECHT [OR] [CIVIL CODE] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art.
208(2) (Switz.). For a translation, see id., available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/
rs/2/210.en.pdf.
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in the chain of causation.18 Extremely short periods for giving notice of
defects19 further militate against domestic Swiss law in the international
context. Similar examples can also be drawn from many other domestic
legal systems.
This background illustrates the urgent need to further harmonize, if
not unify, general contract law. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) would be the most appropriate place
for such a project. Whereas any regional endeavor might mainly focus on
the laws of the respective countries involved, UNCITRAL has the chance
to embark upon a more truly global reflection. Indeed, UNCITRAL is the
only forum with universal participation, i.e., all the regions of the world
have a chance to contribute on equal footing.20 This is the reason why, in
2012, Switzerland made a proposal for the 45th Session of UNCITRAL on
possible future work by UNCITRAL in the area of international contract
law.21 However, this proposal did not suggest how the possible future
work should be conducted; especially what kind of instrument should be
aimed at if one were to come to the conclusion that such future work is
desirable and feasible. Let me give some thoughts to this question, emphasizing that I am speaking entirely for myself and in no way voicing the
official Swiss opinion.
In principle, there is the choice between a convention and a model
law. “A convention is designed to unify law by establishing binding legal
obligations.”22 Its aim is to achieve a very high level of harmonization.23
Although there may be the possibility of having some reservations allowing
state parties a certain, but very limited degree of choice, such reservations
are easily discernible without the need to have recourse to the respective
18. See Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Nov. 28, 2006, 132
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] III 257, 271
(Switz.); see also OBLIGATIONENRECHT I, supra note 16, art. 208, ¶¶ 7–8.
19. Cf. OBLIGATIONENRECHT [OR] [CIVIL CODE] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art.
201(1) (Switz.). For an English translation, see id., available at http://www.admin.
ch/ch/e/rs/2/210.en.pdf (according to which notice must be made immediately
(“sofort”)); see also Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Court] June 27, 1950, 76 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] II 221, 225 (Switz.)
(notice within four days was in time as these included Sunday).
20. UNCITRAL’s membership comprises states from Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean, thereby ensuring that
the main economic and legal systems of the world are represented. For an overview of the today 60 member states, see UNCITRAL, A Guide to UNCITRAL: Basic
Facts About the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 37–41, Annex II
(2013), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/12-57491Guide-to-UNCITRAL-e.pdf [hereinafter A Guide to UNCITRAL 2013].
21. See UNCITRAL, June 25–July 6, 2012, Possible Future Work in the Area of
International Contract Law: Proposal by Switzerland on Possible Future Work by UNCITRAL in the Area of International Contract Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/758 (May 8,
2012) [hereinafter Swiss Proposal], available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/
commission/sessions/45th.html.
22. A Guide to UNCITRAL 2013, supra note 20, at 13.
23. See id. at 14.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014

5

\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-4\VLR414.txt

unknown

Seq: 6

11-JUL-13

8:59

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 14

728

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58: p. 723

domestic law.24 Thus, a convention provides the highest level of predictability for private parties. In contrast, a model law only provides for a legislative text that is recommended to state parties.25 It is used where state
parties want to retain flexibility in implementation “or where strict uniformity is not necessary or desirable.”26
Furthermore, a model law may be finalized and approved by UNCITRAL at its annual session whereas a convention still, in principle, necessitates a diplomatic conference.27 Although, at the political level it may be
certainly easier to convince state governments to agree to a model law
allowing them more leeway, the needs of international commerce clearly
militate in favor of a convention. Even if states were to implement a
model law they could still deviate from the text of such a model law, which
would make it difficult to ascertain the content of the applicable law in a
specific case.
Moreover, there is no obligation for courts of a state that has implemented a model law to regard its international character and the need to
promote uniformity in its interpretation, as it is nowadays provided for in
all recent international conventions.28 Thus, a statute implementing a
model law is purely domestic law and is legitimately interpreted against
the respective domestic background. If a model law may bring about
some harmonization at the beginning this will soon be lost after some
time. This can especially be expected in a traditional field such as contract law where firm dogmatic conceptions and convictions prevail that
have been shaped over centuries and that every lawyer has internalized
from the very first day in law school.
The scope of the envisaged instrument on general contract law
should be similar to the one of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), except that it should
apply to all kinds of contracts and not just to sales. This means, in the first
place, that the instrument should only be concerned with international
contracts and not with purely domestic ones. There is no reason, and it is
not the mandate of UNCITRAL to interfere with domestic relationships.29
If a state feels the need to simplify the situation for its citizens by having
the same law applied to domestic as well as to international contracts, it is
free to do so and implement corresponding domestic legislation as some
states already have chosen in relation to the CISG.30
24. See, e.g., U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods arts. 92–96, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf.
25. See A Guide to UNCITRAL 2013, supra note 20, at 14.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 15.
28. See CISG, supra note 24, art. 7(1).
29. Cf. A Guide to UNCITRAL 2013, supra note 20, at 1–2.
30. Cf. Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, The CISG—Successes and Pitfalls,
57 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 462–63 (2009).
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Like the CISG, the instrument on general contract law should be confined to b2b contracts without touching business-to-consumer (b2c) relationships. Except for Internet transactions that become more and more
international, b2c contracts, to this very day, are mostly domestic contracts. Consumer protection asks for mandatory rules, which stands in
sharp contrast to the need for freedom of contract in b2b contracts. It is
not possible to juggle the needs of both—consumers and businesses—in
one single instrument. The futility of such an endeavor has been demonstrated lately by the draft of a Common European Sales Law.31 Furthermore, the level of consumer protection still differs considerably around
the world; an international consensus in this field probably cannot be
achieved during the decades to come.
In regard to the different areas of contract law that should be addressed, it is clear that the future uniform contract instrument should
cover as many areas as possible. However, there are some fields where
unification is more urgent than in others. The most important area where
the gaps left by the CISG are most unfortunate, because they endanger
uniformity already reached, are questions of validity. Although, it is now
unanimously held that the CISG itself defines what is a question of validity
left to domestic law and what is not,32 many day-to-day contract problems
are issues of validity. To name but a few: questions of consent, such as
mistake, undue influence, or fraud; and validity of individual clauses and
standard terms, such as gross disparity, burdensome obligations, exclusion
and limitation of liability clauses, as well as fixed sums, i.e., penalty and
liquidated damages clauses.33 It is extremely burdensome to have these
questions answered by domestic law, which might well lead to frictions
with unified law. Also very important are issues relating to consequences
of unwinding of contracts34 and set-offs.35 Other areas of contract law, on
the other hand, such as third party rights, assignment and delegation, or
31. See Ingeborg Schwenzer, The Proposed Common European Sales Law and the
Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 44 UCC L.J. 457 (2012). The draft
forms Annex I of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council on a Common European Sales Law. See Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law COM (2011)
635 final (Oct. 11, 2011), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex
UriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0635:FIN:EN:PDF.
32. See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE CONVENTION ON
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) art. 4, ¶ 31 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed.,
3d ed. 2010) (with references).
33. For an overview on how the issues of formation and validity of sales contracts are dealt with in the different legal systems see SCHWENZER ET AL., supra note
6, ¶¶ 9.01–22.25.
34. For an overview on how the unwinding of contracts is dealt with in the
different legal systems see id. ¶¶ 50.01–.36.
35. For a comparative discussion on set-offs, see CHRISTIANA FOUNTOULAKIS,
SET-OFF DEFENCES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 7–128 (2011).
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joint and several obligors and obligees, might not be at the forefront of
desirability for unification.
If one considers working on further unification of contract law the
route to be followed seems to be pretty clear. The starting point must be
the CISG. It has received such tremendous acceptance that anything that
might interfere with it must be refrained from.36 Other UNCITRAL instruments, such as the 1974 Limitation Convention37 or the 1983 Uniform
Rules on Contract Clauses for an Agreed Sum Due Upon Failure of Performance38 should be taken into consideration, and it should be discussed
whether they should be amended. Certainly, of utmost importance are
the Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC).39 The most
valuable work has been completed by the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) and any duplication of efforts
must be prevented. In essence, we face a similar situation as in 1968 when
UNCITRAL started working on the CISG, drawing heavily on the previous
work done by UNIDROIT that had led to the Hague Conventions on the
sale of goods, the Convention relating to a Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods (ULIS), and the Convention relating to Uniform Law
on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULF),
respectively.40 However, there are certain contradictions between CISG
and PICC that need to be eliminated;41 in other areas the possible acceptance of PICC rules at a global level must be carefully scrutinized and
discussed.
Considering what has already been achieved at the international level,
global contract law appears to be feasible within a reasonable amount of
36. The CISG now has seventy-eight member states with the number continuously increasing. Recently, the Brazilian Senate approved the text of the CISG.
Upon completing the accession process Brazil will become the 79th contracting
state. For a list of the current contracting states to the CISG, see UNCITRAL, CISG
Status, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG
_status.html; see also Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, The CISG—A Story of
Worldwide Success, in CISG PART II CONFERENCE 119 (Jan Kleinemann ed., 2009),
available at https://ius.unibas.ch/uploads/publics/9587/20110913164502_4e6f6c
6e5b746.pdf.
37. See UNCITRAL, Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of
Goods, June 14, 1974, 1511 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/texts/sales/limit/limit_conv_E_Ebook.pdf.
38. See UNCITRAL, Texts on Liquidated Damages and Penalty Clauses, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/243, Annex I, June 29, 1983, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/texts/sales/contract/vol14-p272-273-e.pdf.
39. See UNIDROIT, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
(PICC) (2010), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2010/integralversionprinciples2010-e.pdf.
40. For more information on the drafting history of the CISG, see PETER
SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW—THE UN-CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 5, 17–21 (1986).
41. For a comparison of the two instruments, see Michael Joachim Bonell,
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods—Alternatives or Complementary
Instruments?, 2000 BUS. L. INT’L 91, 94–96 (2000).
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time and without consuming too many resources needed elsewhere. How
would the global picture for internationally contracting parties change if
we had an UNCITRAL instrument on general contract law?
First, this instrument—just like the CISG—could be expected to represent a good compromise between common and civil law.42 It would be
acceptable to any party regardless of its own legal background. It would
be a truly neutral law.
Second, it would be drawn up in the six United Nations languages
and it would be translated into the languages of the states adopting this
instrument, and thus be readily available in court and arbitral proceedings
rendering costly translations and expert testimony superfluous. Similar to
the CISG, it could serve as a model for further harmonization of contract
law, also on a domestic level.43 Furthermore, it could be used to teach
traders, who cannot afford in-house counsel or legal advice, the basics of
contract law.44
Third, it would lead to much more predictability in international contracts. It can be expected that the same mechanisms that now support and
enhance the uniform application and interpretation of the CISG will also
play a decisive role for such an instrument. It must be recalled that by now
we have about 3,000 published cases on the CISG,45 we count about 4,000
publications freely accessible on the Internet,46 we have CLOUT47—Case
Law on UNCITRAL Texts, we have the UNCITRAL Digest,48 and further
institutions worldwide such as the CISG Advisory Council,49 that strive to
guard uniformity. Commentaries with article-by-article comments will be
published in different languages. Uniform standard forms that facilitate
contracting will soon emerge on the basis of such an instrument and further add to its predictability.
42. Cf. Ulrich Magnus, The Vienna Sales Convention (CISG) Between Civil and
Common Law—Best of All Worlds?, 3 J. CIV. L. STUD. 67, 74 (2010) (comparing to
CISG).
43. Cf. SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 32, at 462–63 (comparing
CISG as role model for domestic legislators).
44. As it is true with regard to the CISG; cf. SCHWENZER ET AL., supra note 6, ¶
3.21.
45. For cases on the CISG, see CISG online case database, GLOBAL SALES LAW,
http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/index.cfm?pageID=29 (last visited Apr. 16, 2013);
see also CISG Database, PACE LAW SCHOOL, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu.
46. For publications freely accessible on the Internet, see CISG Database, PACE
LAW SCHOOL, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/.
47. See UNCITRAL, Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT), http://www.uncit
ral.org/uncitral/en/case_law.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
48. See UNCITRAL, Digests, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law/
digests.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
49. For more information on the CISG Advisory Council and for the CISG
Advisory Council Opinions, see Welcome to International Sales Convention Advisory
Council (CISG), CISG ADVISORY COUNCIL, http://www.cisgac.com/ (last visited Apr.
16, 2013).
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All in all it can be expected that an UNCITRAL instrument on general contract law may considerably save transaction costs. It may also help
companies with fewer funds to be able to pursue their legal rights under
an international contract and thus further promote international trade.
Finally, it can support the rule of law worldwide.
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